This paper draws on a natural experiment to identify the relationship between income and trust.
Introduction
In 1958, American sociologist Edward C. Banfield identified a set of norms and beliefs that allegedly held back the Southern Italian village of "Montegrano" (Banfield (1967) ). According to Banfield, Montegrano residents were so deeply suspicious towards each other that any collective project became impossible and any attempt to foster civic life would be futile. In short, the economic and social development of Montegrano was impeded by the lack of what modern scholars call "social capital".
Since then, social capital has become one of the most important concepts in social science. Scholars argue that the social capital plays a key role in the production of human capital and public goods (Coleman (1988) ), good governance (Putnam et al. (1994) ), financial development (Guiso et al. (2004) ), political participation (DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) , Berman (1997) , Satyanath et al. (2013) ), efficiency of the judiciary system (La Porta et al. (1997) ), political accountability (Nannicini et al. (2010) ), labor market institutions (Algan and Cahuc (2009) ). Economists have always tried to understand, whether through these or other channels, the social capital has an impact on growth and development. Using country-level and state-level data, Knack and Keefer (1997) , Zak and Knack (2001) , Knack (2003) , Dincer and Uslaner (2010) , , Bjørnskov (2012) , Algan and Cahuc (2013) studied the correlation between social capital and economic growth (or income per capita) generally finding that the social capital (in most cases quantified as generalized trust, or the propensity to trust others) is positively correlated with economic growth.
Given the substantial contribution of social capital to development and growth, it is important to understand what determines the level of social capital in the first place. Banfield's original work offered several explanations of the lack of social capital in Montegrano, but his first choice was the low standard of living.
Montegrano was a poor village where 80 percent of households lived off subsistence farming. A threat of hunger was imminent. Banfield argued that the constant focus on survival led to what he called "amoral familism", or the lack of willingness to cooperate with other villagers outside the nuclear family. Banfield named poverty as the first determinant of the lack of social capital: "The dreadful poverty of the region and the degraded status of those who do manual labor ... are surely of very great importance in forming it [amoral familism]" (Banfield (1967) , p. 139).
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There are at least two reasons to believe that income can affect social capital. First, higher incomes may lead to higher trust because better-off individuals feel more secure economically and are less averse 1 Banfield then discussed three other factors contributing to the 'amoral familism': likely premature death, inefficient land tenure institutions, and the underdeveloped institution of the extended family. However, in the beginning of the Chapter 8 "Origins of the Ethos" he emphasized that the discussion of three other elements "is not to depreciate the importance" of the poverty and the degraded status.
to risk. Since trusting other people may bring both positive and negative returns depending on how the counterpart reciprocates, lower risk aversion may contribute to higher propensity to trust others. Second, higher incomes may lead to higher trust because individuals use income as an observable statistic to infer the degree of fairness of the world around them (and therefore the returns to trusting others).
2 Suppose that an individual's income depends on both her own contribution and on that of the rest of the world; and that the individual cannot directly observe her own productivity. Then individuals who observe higher income attach a higher probability to the scenario that the others are fair towards them.
The cross-sectional evidence from the literature suggests that at both the individual level and at the state level trust is indeed associated with higher income (see, among others, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) and Algan and Cahuc (2013) ). However, establishing a causal relationship between income and trust is difficult as this requires identifying an episode where both income and trust change substantially and where the change in income can be instrumented by a factor that does not affect trust directly.
In this paper, we consider such a natural experiment. We use a large regionally representative survey Most importantly, the effect of the crisis was very uneven across Russia. If we ranked Russian regions by their real GDP per capita growth in 2009, the top quartile would grow by 1 percent, while the bottom quartile would decline by 20 percents. The heterogeneity of the response to the crisis was at least partially explained by the different compositions of the regional economies. As in every recession, the decrease in investment is substantially larger than that in consumption, hence the regions that were more dependent on capital-goods-producing industries, and manufacturing in general, suffered the most. At the same time, the regions specializing in consumer goods and services experienced only a moderate GDP fall or even continued to grow. Russia's regions vary greatly in terms of the composition of the regional GDP: in 9 out of 66 regions in our sample the share of manufacturing in GDP is below 10 per cent, while in two regions the share of manufacturing is more than 50 per cent. The variation is inherited from Soviet industrialization and is plausibly exogenous to the events of 2008-09. This allows constructing an instrument for the potential impact of crisis on income. We use the data on the composition of the Soviet economy compiled by Brown et al. (1993) After instrumenting the change in regional income with the Soviet employment in manufacturing and oil and gas, we find that the effect of change in income on change in trust is statistically significant and large in magnitude. Controlling for other conventional determinants of trust, we show that 10 percent decrease in income is associated with 5 percentage point decrease in the share of respondents who say that most people can be trusted. For Russia, it is a large effect: indeed, the average level of trust in our data is 34 per cent In this sense, our paper contributes to the literature on the long-run impact of recessions on employment (Røed (1996) , Røed (1997) , Blanchard and Summers (1986) ). In particular, our paper provides evidence on a channel through which this effect might operate: recessions destroy social capital that is needed for productive cooperation. Our results are consistent with Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) who show that people facing recessions and macroeconomic disasters in their formative years have distinctly different beliefs -supporting government redistribution and voting for left-wing parties. Our results are also consistent with Fisman et al. (2013) who show in a laboratory setting that people who experience losses are more likely to behave selfishly.
In sum, we demonstrate that trust can change quickly in response to economic shocks, and that the implications of those shocks are persistent. This conclusion is new since most of the scholarship on this topic emphasizes deep historical roots of social capital. Following Putnam et al. (1994) , who famously attributed 3 All estimations have been done in R Stata using ivreg2 package (Baum et al. (2007) ).
low levels of social capital in the Southern Italy to the legacy of late-medieval autocratic Norman regime, authors demonstrate that norms and values today are influenced by the legacies of colonial era (Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) ), Black Death in Europe (Voigtländer and Voth (2011) ), Pale of Settlement in Imperial Russia (Grosfeld et al. (2012) ), communism in Eastern Europe (Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2011) ), Hindu caste system (Hoff et al. (2011) ).
These studies have rather pessimistic policy implications. If social capital is determined by long-term history, then the government's capacity to build social capital is limited. While we do not disagree with those results, our analysis suggests that social capital does have a substantial malleable component that can be influenced by economic policies. For example, if during economic crisis government undertakes generous counter-cyclical fiscal policy, it can prevent the destruction of social capital and thus preclude the long-lasting negative effects of economic shocks.
Our paper therefore contributes to the debate between "Putnam I" and "Putnam II". As discussed in Algan and Cahuc (2013) , "Putnam I" (following Putnam et al. (1994) ) states that trust is very stable over time, and is to a large extent determined by history, while "Putnam II" (after Putnam (2001) ) argues that trust can change substantially in a shorter period of time. While these views do not need to contradict each other, our study can be interpreted as an attempt to quantify the magnitude of "Putnam II", as we show that trust does respond to economic shocks very quickly and estimate this effect. 4 On the other hand, in line with "Putnam I", we also find that large negative shocks to trust may be persistent with trust remaining lower even after income recovers after the crisis.
We also make a methodological contribution to the research on the relationship between social capital and growth. Most of this literature is based on cross-sectional OLS regressions and therefore cannot overcome the issue of causality. As both growth and social capital depend on a multitude of social and political characteristics, it is very hard to come up with a convincing instrument. 5 One notable exception in this literature is who use the data on the origin of immigrants coming to the United
States and timing of their families' arrival to the US. Similarly to the previous studies (e.g. Rice and Feldman (1997), Putnam (2001) , Guiso et al. (2006) ), find that the social capital of the US immigrants is correlated with the social capital in their home countries and therefore can be used 4 Stevenson and Wolfers (2011) also find a relationship between social capital, namely trust in government and financial institutions, and economic shocks during the recent crisis and show that state-level economic shocks do result in lower trust in institutions. Our analysis is different as we study generalized social trust rather than trust in institutions, and that we examine an economy where economic shocks were significantly larger and more heterogeneous. Also, we use an instrument for economic shocks.
5 See Durlauf (2002) , Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005) , and Blume et al. (2010) on the methodological challenges in the econometric research on social capital.
as an instrument for the inherited trust in their countries of origin. They show that inherited trust explains a large part of variation in economic performance in 48 countries. Our paper also uses the instrumental variable approach but we consider the opposite question -whether economic growth influences trust.
We should make two caveats. First, social capital is a broad concept; in this paper we study a very specific and well-defined aspect of social capital -"generalized social trust", the answer of survey respondents to the question "Do you think most people can be trusted or one cannot be too careful dealing with other people?"
There are other dimensions and measurements of social capital (e.g., membership in formal and informal clubs and associations) (Putnam (2001) , Skocpol and Fiorina (1999) , Skocpol (2003) ). Guiso et al. (2010) suggest to introduce a narrower definition -that of the "civic capital" or the set of beliefs that promote cooperation and help overcome free-riding problem. Aghion et al. (2010) understand civic behaviour in a similar way and show that it can be a substitute for regulation. Both Guiso et al. (2010) and Aghion et al. (2010) suggest that one way to measure civic capital is indeed to administer surveys on generalized trust.
Our second caveat is that our quasi-experimental setting only allows to study the determinants of change in trust and not its implications. As crises and recessions have many negative social implications, our data do not allow separating the impact of the fall in trust and direct effect of income shocks. In this paper, we only identify the effect of income on trust; we rely on the large body of research discussed above that shows that trust is important for the political, economic and social development.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief background on the Russian crisis of 2008-09 that motivates our choice of the instruments. In Section 3 we discuss hypotheses, econometric specifications and data. In Section 4 we report the main results. In Section 5 we carry out placebo tests and robustness checks. Futhermore, we provide evidence that the exclusion restriction holds. We also show that large changes in income and trust during the crisis are also observed in other countries. We find that the cross-sectional evidence from the Life in Transition Survey (covering 35 East and West European countries) is consistent with our results. We also estimate cross-sectional regressions and show that the results are comparable to those in Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) who use similar data on the US. In Section 6 we study the evolution of trust in Russian regions after the crisis and analyze the evolution of trust after the crisis. In Russia, the problems were much more acute than in the other large economies. Annual GDP went down by 8 percent in 2009, constituting the largest decline in G20. The shock was not only huge, but sudden: Russian authorities, public, and the business community were caught by surprise. Treisman (2012) reports that, according to the Renaissance Capital (then second largest Russian investment bank), in August Path dependence of economic activity is a widely recognized phenomenon: Krugman (1991) points out that today's concentration of manufacturing in the United States reflects early colonial agricultural settlements in the Northeast. As for the Soviet regional development, Mikhailova (2012) shows that Stalin's industrial policy had long-lasting impact on the growth of Russian cities. Cities that had labor camps established by GULAG (Stalin's Main Administration of Corrective Labor Camps and Labor Settlements) within 50 kilometer distance, grew faster than the cities with the similar observable characteristics. The difference in population persists until 2010, and the effect is larger for the GULAG camps that specialized in building industrial infrastructure, than for the camps that specialized in agriculture and forestry. This evidence strongly suggests that the geographical structure of Russian economy is to a large extent pre-determined by the Soviet heritage and is exogenous to the change in trust between 2008 and 2009. This exogeneity allows us to identify the causal effects of income on trust.
Our instrument is based on the data on the composition of industrial employment in 1989 (see Brown et al. (1993) ). These data come from the 1989 Census of Soviet Manufacturers, the last enterprise census carried out in the command economy before the transition began. This Census has two important advantages. First, the existing institutions of central planning still provided high reliability of the data. Second, the Census pre-dated transition to market and disintegration of Eastern Bloc and Soviet Union hence being exogenous to market forces. Following Brown et al. (1993) , we do not rely on Soviet prices; we use the data on employment structure rather than on composition of ruble sales.
Using the 1989 survey of industrial enterprises for each region of Russia, we calculate Soviet Capital Goods Employment as this region's shares of employment in industries with Standard Industrial Classification 13, 33 and 35 ("oil&gas", "primary metal industries" and "industrial machinery and equipment", respectively) in 1989. 3 Hypotheses, Econometric Specification, and Data
Hypotheses and Specification
Our identification strategy is designed to test a causal notion that more people in a society start to distrust each other as their incomes go down. If this claim is true, the data should reject the null hypothesis about the absence of any statistical association between income and trust: In order to test the hypothesis we need to estimate the following specification:
Here, T rust is an average level of trust in the region i at period t, ∆T rust i is the change in T rust from the (2001)), public goods, higher education (Kumlin and Rothstein (2005) ), inequality (Knack and Keefer (1997) ). To reject H0, the coefficient at ∆Income must be large in magnitude and significantly different from zero.
As Income is an endogenous variable, we use the 2SLS procedure with the first stage as follows:
Here SovietIndustrialStructure i are the values of the instruments introduced in Section 2.
Data
Our data come from two sources: the Public Opinion Foundation (Fond Obschestvennogo Mneniya, or FOM selects respondents using a three-step stratified sample. In the first step, districts are selected to ensure geographical representation (for example, the shares of urban and rural population in the sample are chosen to match the population). In the second step, the settlements are selected randomly with the probability of each settlement to be selected equal to the share of population living there. In the third step, households are selected using random walk procedure. A respondent within a household is selected using gender, age, and educational quotas calculated from the National Census.
Trust is measured by the response to the question "Do you think that most people can be trusted or one cannot be too careful in dealing with people?" This question was asked twice: the first time in the second quarter of 2008, and the second time in the first quarter of 2009. So, our time dimension includes just two periods. While the regions of the survey were the same both times, the households were different. So, for every region we divide respondents between into 3 locations: regional center (for example, Lipetsk in Lipetsk region), non-center urban area (for example, all the cities and towns in Lipetsk region except for Lipetsk itself), and rural area (all the villages). For each of these locations we calculate average values of the variables of interest from the individual responses. Income is measured by the regional Gross Domestic Product per capita deflated by the regional consumer price index.
9 In the robustness checks we also use nominal GDP per capita and real GDP deflated by GDP deflators; the results are similar.
Since our instrument and the income variable are measured at the regional level, we always cluster standard errors at the regional level as well.
Data on the respondents' age and level of education also come from FOM surveys. Data on inequality and homicide rates come from Rosstat (and are also therefore also at the regional level). Table 15 in the Appendix presents the descriptive statistics of the variables for both years.
Results

Main Results
We first present the OLS results. We regress the difference in trust between 2008 and 2009 on the difference in log GDP per capita and an array for controls (Table 1 ). The point estimate varies from 0.12 to 0.24, and is not statistically different from zero in most specifications.
While OLS results cannot reject the absence of the effect of income on trust, these estimations cannot be interpreted causally for two main reasons that can attenuate the real effect. Firstly, there can be endogeneity, since the difference in GDP per capita and the difference in trust can be jointly determined by a change in an omitted variable. Secondly, as it is usual for difference-in-difference estimation, measurement error can be a serious problem, because GDP is persistent, especially between the two adjacent years, and the measure is imperfect, the noise can attenuate the effect. 10 In order to mitigate the problem of the measurement error, we also run OLS and 2SLS regressions where we use quartiles of change in GDP instead of continuous GDP changes (see Section 5.2).
11 Figures 8 and 9 in the Appendix present the cross-national scatter plot of trust and GDP per capita. Trust in Russia is 25 percentage points, roughly the same as the world average (25%) and very close to the cross-country trend both in 2005-08 and Note: The dependent variable is the change in the share of people who answered that "most people can be trusted" in a particular location between 2008 and 2009. The change in the log regional GDP per capita is taken from Russian State Statistics Agency (Rosstat). Changes in Gini and changes in homicide rate are also taken from Rosstat. Individual characteristics (Education, Age, and Age squared) are calculated using the survey responses averaged out at the level of location: regional center, non-center urban area, and rural area in a region. Education is a share of people with at least unfinished college degree. Homicide rate is the number of murders and assaults per 100 000 people in a year calculated at the regional level. In column (6), we exclude the faster growing and the fastest falling regions (Sakhalin and Vologda, respectively). Robust standard errors (clustered by 66 regions) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Note: The dependent variable is the change in the log regional real GDP per capita between 2008 and 2009. All explanatory variables are calculated using two repeated cross-sections of 66 Russian regions. Individual characteristics (Education, Age, and Age squared) are averaged out at the level of location: regional center, non-center urban area, and rural area in a region. Education is a share of people with at least unfinished college degree. Gini is the regional Gini coefficient. Homicide rate is the number of murders and assaults per 100 000 people in a year calculated on a regional level. In column (6), we exclude the faster growing and the fastest falling regions (Sakhalin and Vologda, respectively). Robust standard errors (clustered by 66 regions) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Note:All variables are calculated using two repeated cross-sections of 66 Russian regions. Individual characteristics (Trust, Education, Age, and Age squared) are averaged out at the level of location: regional center, non-center urban area, rural area in a region. Education is a share of people with at least unfinished college degree. Gini is the regional Gini coefficient. Homicide rate is the number of murders and assaults per 100 000 people per year calculated at the regional level. In column (6), we exclude the faster growing and the fastest falling regions (Sakhalin and Vologda, respectively). In all specifications, Hansen J test of overidentification never rejects the null hypothesis. Robust standard errors (clustered by 66 regions) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Channels of Impact of Income on Trust
Income can affect trust through at least two mechanisms that we described in Introduction. First, as risk aversion usually decreases with income, a lower income may make individuals more risk-averse and therefore less prone to trust others. Second, a decrease in income may result in individuals' updating of their beliefs about the fairness of the world hence reducing their willingness to trust others.
In order to distinguish between the two stories, we estimate the differences in the effect of change in income on change in trust for different categories of individuals. In particular, we test whether the effect is stronger for subsamples stratified by age, education and personal income.
The second mechanism (related to learning/inference of the fairness of the world) should be more pro- functional form of the utility function. Indeed, given the income, the older and the poorer individuals are more risk-averse. However, the effect of age on the marginal change of risk-aversion to change in income depends on the utility function's third derivative. For a standard utility function with a constant relative risk aversion the first mechanism should be more salient for the older individuals (they should be more risk-averse) and for the poorer individuals.
The results for the subsamples are presented in the Table 4 . Each column presents the second stage estimates where the first stage is the same as in the Table 1 , specification (5). The dependent variable is the average level of trust within the subregion for the individuals with a specific characteristic (low, medium, high income, young, middle-aged, senior, and with and without higher education). In the case of income and age, we divide the sample into three equal terciles, while in the case of education we just separate those with and without tertiary education. 195 193 195 195 195 195 195 195 Note: All specifications, independent variables and sources of data are the same as in Table 3 . The dependent variables is the change of trust for the subsample of individuals from the bottom tercile, the medium tercile and the top tercile of income, respectively, for young, middle-aged and senior, and for the subsamples with and without higher education. Robust standard errors (clustered by 66 regions) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We find that the effect of income on trust holds for the individuals with higher income, lower education, and for those of younger age. The second and the third results are consistent with the inference mechanism.
The first and the third result are in contradiction with the risk aversion mechanism. Overall, the results presented in the Table 4 are in support of the "inference" explanation.
Our results on the effect of age should be treated with caution. Since we only have one historical episode we cannot distinguish between the age effect and the cohort effect. Older Russian may have had very different life experiences from those of the younger Russians. Unfortunately, measuring the effect of differential life experiences is impossible without a long-term panel of data on trust.
5 Additional Evidence
Placebo Tests
In this section we test whether our result (the correlation between decline in income and decline in trust)
is not an artefact of correlation between trends in these two variables. To check this, we use yet another
GeoRating survey by FOM. In the third quarter of 2007 the survey included a question on trust although it allowed for fewer response categories (this is why we do not use it in the main regression).
If our results are driven by the trends in income and trust that are unrelated to the effect of income on trust, we should find a correlation between the change in income instrumented by the structure of the regional economy and the change in trust between 3Q2007 and 2Q2008.
We estimate an instrumental variables specification where the change in income is still instrumented by the 1989 industrial structure, but in the second stage we study the impact of the change in income on the change in trust between 2007 and 2008. Effectively, we test whether our results would still hold for the period between 3Q2007 and 2Q2008. If we found significant positive coefficients in the second stage, it would imply that the relationship between income and trust is due to unobserved factors unrelated to the crisis.
Indeed, in Russia the period between 3Q2007 and 2Q2008 was still a period of growth rather than that of recesssion. According to official data, Russian GDP in 2Q2008 was 7% higher than in 3Q2007 (in constant prices, seasonally adjusted).
The second stage results are presented in Table 5 . The coefficients are negative and insignificant. This shows that our results presented in Table 3 are not due to pre-existing trends but are indeed related to the shock of crisis that took place between the second quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009. Note: All specifications, independent variables and sources of data are the same as in Table 3 . Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the regional level. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Regressions with a Discrete Measure of Recession
In order to make sure that the results are unlikely to be driven by the measurement error (as is always a risk with difference-in-difference estimation), we re-estimate the main OLS and 2SLS specifications using a discrete measure of recession. Instead of using a continuous value of change in real GDP per capita, we use a categorical variable with 4 values: 1 -for the bottom quartile of change in GDP between 2008 and 2009 (fall in real GDP per capita between 39% and 15%), 2 -for the second-from-the-bottom quartile (fall between 15% and 9%), 3 -for the third-from-the-bottom quartile (fall between 9% and 5%), 4 -for the top quartile (GDP change from -5% to +10%).
The results of the OLS regressions are presented in Table 6 . In our preferred specifications, the coefficient on a quartile of change is around 0.02 implying that one quartile change is associated with 2 percentage point of change in trust. So, the change from the bottom to top quartile is associated with 4 percentage point change in trust, while the change from minimal level of GDP change to the maximum level of GDP change is associated with 8 percentage point of change in trust. Table 7 presents the results of 2SLS estimations where the quartile of change in GDP is instrumented by the Soviet-era industrial structure. As in the previous estimations, we find a statistically significant and Note: The dependent variable is the change in the share of people who answered that "most people can be trusted" in a particular location between 2008 and 2009. Quartile is a quartile of change in log regional GDP per capita. The change in the log regional GDP per capita is taken from Russian State Statistics Agency (Rosstat). Changes in Gini and changes in homicide rate are also taken from Rosstat. Individual characteristics (Education, Age, and Age squared) are calculated using the survey responses averaged out at the level of location: regional center, non-center urban area, and rural area in a region. Education is a share of people with at least unfinished college degree. Homicide rate is the number of murders and assaults per 100 000 people in a year calculated at the regional level. In column (6), we exclude the faster growing and the fastest falling regions (Sakhalin and Vologda, respectively). Robust standard errors (clustered by 66 regions) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 large effect of change in GDP on the change in trust. In our preferred specification, an increase in GDP change by a quartile is associated with 4 percentage points of increase in the change in trust. Therefore a two-quartile change (from the region with 15 percent fall in GDP to 5 percent fall in GDP) is associated with 8 percentage point fall in trust; this is similar to our 2SLS estimates with a continuous measure of change in GDP (where a 10 percent change in GDP is a associated with 5-6 percentage point change in trust. Note: The dependent variable is the change in the share of people who answered that "most people can be trusted" in a particular location between 2008 and 2009. Quartile is a quartile of change in log regional GDP per capita. The change in the log regional GDP per capita is taken from Russian State Statistics Agency (Rosstat). Changes in Gini and changes in homicide rate are also taken from Rosstat. Individual characteristics (Education, Age, and Age squared) are calculated using the survey responses averaged out at the level of location: regional center, non-center urban area, and rural area in a region. Education is a share of people with at least unfinished college degree. Homicide rate is the number of murders and assaults per 100 000 people in a year calculated at the regional level. In column (6), we exclude the faster growing and the fastest falling regions (Sakhalin and Vologda, respectively). Robust standard errors (clustered by 66 regions) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robustness Checks and Alternative Explanations
In order to test the robustness of our results, we perform a number of additional tests. First, we try to understand whether any of our three instruments is critical for our results. We remove one instrument at a time and re-estimate regressions with just two remaining instruments. The results are presented in the first three columns of the Tables 8 (the first stage) and 9 (the second stage). The first specification (using the metal products and machinery and equipment only) is especially important as the allocation of oil and gas production may be driven by geographical characteristics that may affect change in trust through other channels. Note: All specifications, independent variables and sources of data are the same as in Table 2 . Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the regional level. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
In all three cases, the effect of income on trust is significant; its magnitude does not change. In one of the specifications, the F statistic falls to 7 (this is when we only use shares of SIC38 and SIC13 sectors but drop SIC33). In the first specification where we do not use the share of employment in oil and gas, the F statistic actually increases to 15.
In the fourth column, we reproduce our results with an alternative measure of inequality, the Gini coefficient based on the self-reported income categories (see Section 5.5 for a detailed description of these Note: All specifications, independent variables and sources of data are the same as in Table 3 . Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the regional level. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 data). We find that the change in this Gini coefficient is negatively correlated with change in trust but its use does not affect the magnitude or the statistical significance of the impact of change in income on change in trust.
The main alternative explanation for our results is that the Soviet industrial structure affects change in trust during the crisis through channels different from change in income. It is entirely plausible that regions that have inherited industries specializing in capital goods production and in oil and gas differ from other regions in many respects, including the social fabric and the level of social capital. However, it is not clear why these differences should affect the change in trust during the crisis. If anything, these regions should have become more-rather than-less resilient to economic volatility. In order to check whether the level of trust matters for our estimations of the effects of change in income on trust, we carried out several tests.
First, we checked whether the level of trust is correlated with our instruments. We ran a regression of the We also checked (regressions available on request) whether the relationship between trust and income is non-linear. We ran specifications with squared change in income as well as used a semi-parametric estimation for regressions in Table Table 3 . We found no non-linearities. The coefficient at squared income change is not significant, and the non-parametric relationship between change in trust and change in income (Table 3 and Figure 5 ) is virtually linear.
International Evidence
The results above provide evidence on the relationship between income and trust within one country. In order to understand whether these results are driven by unique features of Russia, in this section we study data In 2006 and 2010, LITS was undertaken in different locations. Therefore we cannot carry out a differencein-differences exercise similar to the one we did for Russia in Section 4. Also, the sample was not representative at the PSU level. Therefore the evidence in this section can only be viewed as illustrative. Yet, it is interesting to see whether the relationships between effect of the crisis, income, and trust still hold in the international data, at least in cross-sectional correlations.
We use 2010 individual data to calculate vulnerability to crisis. Following Grosjean and Ricka (2013), we use their "synthetic consumption response index" as a proxy for the effect of the crisis: we add up positive responses to the questions about whether individual had to reduce consumption of staple food, limit tobacco smoking, delay medical appointments, postpone buying necessary medications, and accumulated arrears on utility bills.
The results are presented in the Table 10 . In Column 1 we regress the individual level of trust on the "synthetic consumption response" controlling for individual characteristics and country dummies. We find a negative and significant coefficient at the consumption response variable. This effect does not change magnitude and remains significant even when we control for the average consumption response within the PSU. The effect of average consumption response itself, however, is small and not significant.
In Columns 3 and 4 we investigate the relationship between crisis impact, trust, and income. LITS does not include questions on income per se, yet the respondents provide their relative rank in income distribution within a country. Therefore, once we control for country dummies, we can use this variable as a measure of household income. We find that income is indeed lower in households who report a higher consumption response (Column 3). We also find that income and trust are positively correlated even if control for consumption response (Column 4). Moreover, once we include income, the consumption response becomes insignificant. This is consistent with a conjecture that crisis impacts trust through income. Figure 10 in the Appendix presents a scatter plot of the predicted probability of trust (from the linear probability model of Column 1) and the consumption response. (2002) (who use the General Social Survey in the US). We find that signs and even magnitudes of coefficients of respondents of the FOM survey in Russia are generally similar to those found by Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) . This further suggests that our data on trust are comparable to those in other countries and that our results are not likely to be driven by certain Russia-specific factors.
We estimate probit regressions separately for 2008 and 2009 cross-sections. The dependent variable is 1 if the respondent says that "most people can be trusted" and is 0 if they say that "one cannot be too careful dealing with other people". We also include age, age squared, gender, income, and education. For income, we use self-reported income data. The survey asks whether the household's per capita monthly income is in one of 16 broad categories.
13
The 2009 survey also included questions on the respondents' employment status and occupation (if employed). The descriptive statistics of the employment status and occupational dummies are reported in The results are presented in Table 11 . We report marginal effects. In regressions (1), (3), (5) we include regional dummies and control for the type of the subregion (rural, urban or regional center, with the latter being the omitted category). 14 In regressions (2), (4), (6) we include subregional dummies.
In all specifications trust is positively correlated with personal income. 10% increase in personal income is associated with 0.8 percentage points increase in a probability of a person trusting others in 2009 survey.
In 2008 survey, the effect is twice is large. In Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) the coefficient is similar in 13 The respondents are asked whether their income is below or above the following fifteen thresholds: 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 20, 25, 30, 45 thousand rubles. In 2008 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 20, 25, 30, 45 thousand rubles. In -2009 , a thousand rubles was about 30 US dollars. These categories are too broad to use these data for change in income over time so we only use these data for the cross-sectional analysis.
14 We have also run the estimations with median income, median income squared and Gini index calculated at the subregional level. The coefficients at the individual characteristics did not change. We also find a positive correlation between trust and education. Higher education is associated with 13-16 percentage point increase in trust. This effect is also similar to the one found in Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) : there having less than 12 years of education is associated with 13 percentage point lower trust and having more than 16 years of education is associated with 18 percentage point higher trust than for having 12-16 years of education. In Russia, having more than 16 years of education is equivalent to having postmasters degrees and is therefore very rare; thus the main comparison in our sample is between those having less than 12 years (secondary but no higher education) and having 12-16 years (higher education but no post-graduate degrees).
Crisis and Trust in Government
Economic performance can have implications not only for the generalized social trust but also for the trust in public institutions (Stevenson and Wolfers (2011) ). Unfortunately, GeoRating lacks consistent questions about the trust in public institutions and it also lacks questions where the word "trust" and any of government officials appear in the same sentence. The closest question to the trust in government is the question about approval of Russian then-prime minister Vladimir Putin. We find no connection in regional variation in the changes of Putin's approval rating and economic crisis. This may seem puzzling since other authors document significant correlation between incumbent's popularity and economic conditions both in hybrid regimes and democracies (Monroe (1978) , Colton and Hale (2009), Treisman (2011) ).
One potential explanation for this effect would be related to the effectiveness of the anti-crisis policies that mitigated the impact of the crisis on government's popularity. 15 However, in our case, the relief efforts started after the first quarter of 2009 (when our survey on trust was administered). A more plausible explanation is that during the crisis, the government stepped up propaganda efforts to convince the Russian households that the crisis was driven by external factors and has nothing to do with the government's performance. We leave a more systematic analysis of this phenomenon to future research.
Persistence of the Decline in Trust
We have shown that Russian regions exposed to the the crisis of 2008-2009 had a larger decrease in trust than the regions with the smaller exposure. Is the effect persistent? Does trust go up again when economy recovers or does it remain stuck at the low level? In this section, we offer evidence that suggests the effect is persistent at least in some regions; trust does not always improve even when the income is restored.
In 2014 if it was smaller than the median, we call it "small". Table 12 The differences in the changes in trust between regions with large and small drops are economically important and statistically significant. Table 13 shows results of the following simple estimation: To show that the trust was more likely to recover in places, where the initial drop was not small, we estimate the following regression for the two subsamples:
where T rustChange0914 i is the change in the level of trust in subregion i between 2009 and 2014. GDP pcChange is the change in Gross Regional Product per capita between 2009 and 2012.
16 EducationChange i is a change If trust recovers after the crisis, we expect β 1 to be negative and large in absolute value: the larger is the decline during the crisis, the faster the subsequent recovery. Table 14 presents the results. We find that the coefficient β 1 is negative and large only in the sample with the small 2009 decline. In the sample with the large 2009 decline, the subsequent evolution of trust is not related to the fall of trust during the crisis. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that if the income shocks result in a substantial decrease in trust then the effect may persist even after incomes bounces back to the initial level. 
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we study the relationship between changes in income and changes in trust. In order to identify the causal effect, we use the sharp-and spatially uneven-decline in Russian GDP in the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009. We find that the regions, whose economy historically relied on the production of capital goods and oil and gas, were more vulnerable to the global crisis and therefore experienced a larger decline in trust than other regions.
We interpret this result as evidence in favor of the effect of income on trust. Alternative explanations of our results would have to argue that regional economies specialising in capital goods may have developed special social institutions. While it is entirely plausible to assume that such institutions affect the level of social capital in these regions, it is difficult to understand why these institutions should have an impact on the changes in trust over a very short period of time. And even if such a relationship between industrial specialisation and resilience of trust to crisis existed, it would be likely to work in the opposite direction: regions vulnerable to crisis should have been more-rather than less-resilient in the challenging times. This is why we believe that our results imply that inherited industrial structure affects trust through income.
Our results cannot distinguish between different explanations of the relationship between income and trust -whether it is driven by risk aversion or by inference based on income (or other potential explanations).
But whatever the origin of the effect of income on trust, its magnitude is substantial: on average, 10 percent decline in income is associated with 5 percentage points decrease in trust. Given the low average level of trust in Russia (25%, according to the World Values Survey), this is a substantial effect.
We also study the post-crisis evolution of trust in Russian regions to understand whether the impact of crisis on trust had a persistent or transitory effect. After the deep recession in 2009 Russian GDP has recovered back to the pre-crises levels and even exceeded them in 2012-14. Trust also rose but did not return to its pre-crisis levels. We find that the change in trust after the crisis was very heterogeneous. In the regions where the decline in trust was small, trust fully recovered to the pre-crisis level. However, in those regions where the shock of crisis on trust was strong, the impact of crisis was persistent: in 2014, trust in those regions was still 10 percentage points below the respective 2008 levels. These findings shed a new light on our understanding of the social costs of recessions and have very clear policy implications. Governments should respond quickly and decisively to crises with countercyclical social policies in order to prevent the recession's strong impact on trust -as the latter may have implications for social capital even after the recession is over. 
